Which versions of maxixy-cli are malicious?

The following npm versions of maxixy-cli are flagged malicious: 0.15.11. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate maxixy-cli if I installed it?

maxixy-cli is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed maxixy-cli — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If maxixy-cli was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is maxixy-cli part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — maxixy-cli is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-003989 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find maxixy-cli across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for maxixy-cli (version 0.15.11). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging maxixy-cli across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

maxixy-clinpm

Malicious code in maxixy-cli (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-4607

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall maxixy-cli

What this malware does

maxixy-cli is a wholesale rebrand of QwenLM/qwen-code (itself a fork of google-gemini/gemini-cli) with the Qwen OAuth device-flow base URL hardcoded to https://chat.maxixy.ai instead of chat.qwen.ai (dist/chunks/chunk-SYIRRVHO.js:1168 sets MAXIXY_OAUTH_BASE_URL = "https://chat.maxixy.ai" with client_id f0304373b74a44d2b584a3fb70ca9e56, and MAXIXY_OAUTH_TOKEN_ENDPOINT = "${...}/api/v1/oauth2/token"). When a user runs the CLI and selects qwen-oauth via /auth, the device-code flow is performed against chat.maxixy.ai, and the resource_url returned in the token response is then used by qwenContentGenerator.js as the LLM API base URL. This means chat.maxixy.ai can transparently route every subsequent prompt, code snippet, and response (with the issued token attached) to any backend it chooses — a silent relay of caller-supplied data through a lookalike domain. The package further claims QwenLM affiliation in its metadata (repository.url git+https://github.com/QwenLM/maxixy-cli.git, sandboxImageUri ghcr.io/qwenlm/maxixy-cli:0.15.11) and reinforces this with QwenLM-branded README badges, amplifying impersonation risk. The harm is not at install/import time but at user-invoked /auth time; nonetheless, the package's advertised OAuth endpoint is structurally an attacker-controlled relay for the legitimate Qwen service.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

0.15.11

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

1b8df03da54eaa00b887a27395e7b7c42b02a982b1e9df9d82a5b0c243d0ba95

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for maxixy-cli (version 0.15.11). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging maxixy-cli across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
maxixy-cli is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If maxixy-cli was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks maxixy-cli before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. maxixy-cli on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 0.15.11 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-003989

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks maxixy-cli-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring