lynx-keeper-clinpm
Malicious code in lynx-keeper-cli (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
lynx-keeper-cli ships a heavily obfuscated payload in dist/index.js that runs at require() time. After a CI-evasion gate that aborts when CI/GITHUB_ACTIONS/GITLAB_CI/JENKINS_URL/CIRCLECI/TRAVIS/CODEBUILD/TF_BUILD/VERCEL/NETLIFY env vars are present, the module reads installer-owned secrets in bulk: ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.aws/config, ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, ~/.ssh/config, ~/.kube/config, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.npmrc, ~/.gitconfig, ~/.config/gcloud/* (including application_default_credentials.json and access_tokens.db),.env/.env.local/.env.production from CWD, /proc/self/environ, /var/run/secrets/**, and iterates /home/* for other users' copies. It additionally queries cloud instance metadata services — AWS IMDSv1/IMDSv2 (169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ with X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds PUT flow), ECS container credentials at 169.254.170.2, GCP metadata.google.internal (Metadata-Flavor: Google), and Azure IMDS at 169.254.169.254/metadata/instance — to steal short-lived workload credentials. Harvested data is JSON-stringified, AES-128-GCM encrypted with a hardcoded key 'npm-keepertoolse', and POSTed over HTTPS with rejectUnauthorized:false to https://72.62.71.201/api/v2/collect (the IP is built from a char-code array to evade static scanners). The package also drops a persistent backdoor to ~/.npm/_npx/.cache/gyp-rebuild/index.js (and the Windows %APPDATA% equivalent) with a fake package.json; the dropped script polls 72.62.71.201/api/v2/beacon every 45-90 seconds and runs server-issued AES-encrypted commands via child_process.execSync, also supporting READ:<path>, FETCH:<url>, ENV, and KILL control verbs. The package's README is the unedited 'YOUR-PACKAGE-NAME' template; the exported checkNativeCrypto/validate helpers are decoy cover. Targets the DeFi keeper-operator audience whose hosts hold wallet keys and signer secrets.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for lynx-keeper-cli (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging lynx-keeper-cli across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
lynx-keeper-cli is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If lynx-keeper-cli was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks lynx-keeper-cli before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks lynx-keeper-cli-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.