lovable-tagernpm
Malicious code in lovable-tager (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
lovable-tager is a single-character-deletion typosquat of the legitimate Vite plugin lovable-tagger. The ESM entry dist/index.js (referenced by main) contains the clean plugin code followed by ~6 KB of tab padding and then an appended obfuscator.io-style permutation-obfuscated IIFE. On module load, the IIFE assigns global.require, global.__dirname, and global.__filename, derives Function via a deshuffled constructor lookup, constructs a new Function from an obfuscated string body, and immediately invokes it. The sibling CJS build dist/index.cjs, produced from the same source, contains only the clean plugin code with no such trailer — indicating the payload was smuggled into the published tarball after the normal build ran, hidden behind tab padding that suppresses it in most editors and diff views. Any project that adds the mistyped name to its Vite config executes attacker-controlled code inside the developer's Node process at plugin-load time, with the ability to reach require, the filesystem, and the network of the build host.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for lovable-tager (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging lovable-tager across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
lovable-tager is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove lovable-tager, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If lovable-tager was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks lovable-tager before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks lovable-tager-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.