log-taker1npm
log-taker1 is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-6690) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 0.1.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in log-taker1 (npm)
What this malware does
Malicious npm package published as part of a coordinated DeFi-themed infostealer campaign. log-taker1 embeds a full infostealer (~2800 lines) directly in index.js, executed at install time via postinstall: node test.js. The payload harvests cryptocurrency wallet vaults (MetaMask, Phantom, Solflare, OKX, Coinbase, TrustWallet, Backpack, TronLink), browser cookies and credentials, SSH keys, AWS credentials, .npmrc tokens, Docker config, shell history, and password manager databases, exfiltrating all data to the C2 domain log-taker.store. The C2 is shared with the rohmat2527 maintainer account.
[email protected] ships an index.js that requires child_process and invokes execSync('bash...') and execSync('zsh...') to shell out at load time. The package name ('log-taker') combined with direct execSync calls against both bash and zsh is consistent with shell-history collection — reading.bash_history /.zsh_history (or piping history / fc -l through the shell) — for off-host exfiltration. Shell history routinely contains credentials, tokens, connection strings, and hostnames, so harvesting it is credential theft regardless of any 'logging'/'backup' framing implied by the package name. The traced content also tripped the provider's malware-output safety filter, which corroborates that the code reads as operational credential-harvest logic rather than benign shell invocation.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for log-taker1 (version 0.1.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging log-taker1 across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
log-taker1 is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If log-taker1 was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks log-taker1 before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- SafeDep · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks log-taker1-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.