Which versions of log-min are malicious?

The following npm versions of log-min are flagged malicious: 1.0.13. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate log-min if I installed it?

log-min is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove log-min, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.

I already installed log-min — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If log-min was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is log-min part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — log-min is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-014716 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find log-min across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for log-min (version 1.0.13). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging log-min across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

log-minnpm

log-min is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12396) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 1.0.13). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in log-min (npm)

MAL-2026-12396

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall log-min

What this malware does

The package publishes as 'log-min' with a description claiming it is a JavaScript library for the Theta Blockchain, while its README identifies the project as 'chain-sdk-js' — an impersonation of the Theta chain-sdk-js SDK. package.json declares postinstall 'node src', which loads src/providers/BaseProvider.js. That module's top-level IIFE imports an opaque blob 'desKey' from the 'thedata' npm dependency, DES-decrypts it with the hardcoded password 'hydra', spawns a detached 'node' child process with piped stdin and ignored stdio, writes the decrypted code into the child's stdin, and unrefs the child so it survives the installer. The identical decrypt-and-exec pattern is also present at the top level of the shipped CJS bundle dist/log-min.cjs.js, so the dropper fires both at 'npm install' via the postinstall hook and whenever any consumer require()s the package. The executed bytes originate in a separate dependency ('thedata') and are not present in the log-min tarball, giving the author of that dependency arbitrary code execution on any machine that installs or imports log-min.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.0.13

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

5dc78815e8c40947273929a7224aa04230de911771e62580045fb8bb213468c9

Detection & response playbook

Typosquat

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for log-min (version 1.0.13). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging log-min across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
log-min is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove log-min, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If log-min was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks log-min before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. log-min on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.0.13 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-014716

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks log-min-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

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