Which versions of lodahs-cli are malicious?

The following npm versions of lodahs-cli are flagged malicious: 1.0.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate lodahs-cli if I installed it?

lodahs-cli establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.

I already installed lodahs-cli — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If lodahs-cli was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is lodahs-cli part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — lodahs-cli is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-018252 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find lodahs-cli across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for lodahs-cli (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging lodahs-cli across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

lodahs-clinpm

lodahs-cli is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-14180) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 1.0.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in lodahs-cli (npm)

MAL-2026-14180

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall lodahs-cli

What this malware does

The postinstall lifecycle script in scripts/postinstall.js executes automatically on npm install and performs three attacker-benefiting actions. First, it POSTs a platform fingerprint as JSON to a hardcoded bare-IP endpoint at http://193.70.34.101:20099/vote (host assembled from a split array to hide the literal), acting as an install-time beacon. Second, it XOR-decodes (key 'stf2026') a hidden URL that resolves to https://github.com/beb1raz1/qPzM50V1AKG0rVlH/releases/download/null/main.exe — an unrelated personal GitHub account with an obfuscated repository name — downloads main.exe to %TEMP%, and spawns it detached. Third, when /proc/version indicates WSL, installAddonViaBridge() concatenates additional XOR-decoded segments into a shell command passed to child_process.exec with windowsHide:true, crossing the WSL boundary to fetch and execute the same.exe on the Windows host. The package name resembles a reversal of 'shadol'/'lodash' but the shipped code is a dropper rather than any CLI; there are no source files matching the advertised purpose.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.0.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

15cec128c194761de8cd73923062ece7e4104b5e6130ca40882c5ac9d3f83914

Detection & response playbook

Backdoor / remote access

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for lodahs-cli (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging lodahs-cli across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
lodahs-cli establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If lodahs-cli was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks lodahs-cli before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. lodahs-cli on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.0.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-018252

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks lodahs-cli-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

All malware advisories How O3 detects malware Vulnerability database