loadutilsnpm
Malicious code in loadutils (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package loadutils is a typosquat of the widely-used webpack helper loader-utils. The shipped README documents the loader-utils API (urlToRequest, interpolateName, getHashDigest), but src/index.js instead exports a debug-style logger — name, documentation, and implementation do not align. On import, src/index.js executes require('debug-glitzs') at the top level, but debug-glitzs is not declared in dependencies, peerDependencies, or optionalDependencies; whatever resolves to that name in the installer's tree runs in the Node.js process as soon as loadutils is required. package.json additionally declares lessload@^1.0.1 as a runtime dependency that is never referenced in src/ and is unrelated to either the logger code or the advertised loader-utils API, pulling further unaccounted code into the installer's dependency tree on npm install. The contributors metadata also impersonates a well-known maintainer (Kiko Beats paired with an unrelated homepage alphacointech1010.com), reinforcing the deceptive packaging.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for loadutils (version 1.0.4). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging loadutils across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
loadutils is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove loadutils, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If loadutils was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks loadutils before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks loadutils-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.