loadutilsnpm
loadutils is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-6580) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious versions 1.0.4, 1.0.5, 1.0.6). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in loadutils (npm)
What this malware does
Package loadutils is a typosquat of the widely-used webpack helper loader-utils. The shipped README documents the loader-utils API (urlToRequest, interpolateName, getHashDigest), but src/index.js instead exports a debug-style logger — name, documentation, and implementation do not align. On import, src/index.js executes require('debug-glitzs') at the top level, but debug-glitzs is not declared in dependencies, peerDependencies, or optionalDependencies; whatever resolves to that name in the installer's tree runs in the Node.js process as soon as loadutils is required. package.json additionally declares lessload@^1.0.1 as a runtime dependency that is never referenced in src/ and is unrelated to either the logger code or the advertised loader-utils API, pulling further unaccounted code into the installer's dependency tree on npm install. The contributors metadata also impersonates a well-known maintainer (Kiko Beats paired with an unrelated homepage alphacointech1010.com), reinforcing the deceptive packaging.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for loadutils (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging loadutils across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
loadutils is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove loadutils, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If loadutils was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks loadutils before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks loadutils-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.