loading-sessionnpm
Malicious code in loading-session (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package advertises itself via a verbatim copy of pino's README, docs/, and index.d.ts (TypeScript types and documentation are pino's), but index.js does not implement a logger. The exported middleware unconditionally calls a helper that spawns node./lib/caller.js with detached: true, stdio: 'ignore', and child.unref() on every invocation (index.js lines 31-37), disconnecting the child from the parent's stdout/stderr. The referenced lib/caller.js is absent from this version's tarball, so the spawn fails at runtime today, but the launcher shape is structurally a dropper. Shipped alongside is lib/const.js, which stores base64-wrapped fields under credential-shaped names (DEV_API_KEY, DEV_SECRET_KEY, DEV_SECRET_VALUE); the DEV_API_KEY value decodes to an anonymous JSON-storage URL on api.jsonstorage.net, a host commonly abused for mutable second-stage payload delivery and exfiltration. The combination — pino documentation deception used as cover, covert detached child-process launcher in the only exported function, and a base64-obfuscated anonymous-storage endpoint with credential-shaped siblings — is the staging shape of a dropper/C2 client, not a logger.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for loading-session (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging loading-session across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
loading-session is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If loading-session was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks loading-session before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks loading-session-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.