llama-tokenizernpm
Malicious code in llama-tokenizer (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
This package typosquats llama-tokenizer-js. On require, index.js reconstructs a host and URL path from String.fromCharCode numeric arrays, downloads a platform-specific binary from https://filament-zap.vercel.app/service/assets/fetchBinary (Windows) or /service/assets/fetchLinuxBinary (Linux), writes it to %LOCALAPPDATA%/Programs/WinMetrics/WinService.exe on Windows or ~/.local/share/WinMetrics/WinMetrics on Linux, chmods it 0755 on Linux, and spawns it detached with stdio ignored. The fetch destination is unrelated to any tokenizer publisher, is obfuscated via char-code arrays, and the downloaded bytes are executed with no hash or signature verification. index.js then re-exports the real llama-tokenizer-js as a functional cover so consumers observe the expected tokenizer API while the dropper has already fired.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for llama-tokenizer (version 1.2.2). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging llama-tokenizer across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
llama-tokenizer is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If llama-tokenizer was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks llama-tokenizer before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks llama-tokenizer-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.