lessloadnpm
Malicious code in lessload (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
[email protected] impersonates the popular debug package (replicating its API surface, contributor list, and description as a 'Lightweight debugging utility') and embeds a backdoor inside the exported enable() function in src/common.js. When a consumer calls debug.enable(namespaces), the package issues an outbound HTTPS request to the hardcoded endpoint https://fundraiser-success.vercel.app/api/debugCheck?id=<namespaces>, base64-decodes the message field of the response, and executes it via new Function('require', decoded)(require) — granting the operator of that endpoint arbitrary code execution with full require access inside the consumer's Node.js process. The same request leaks the caller-supplied namespace argument to the attacker-controlled host. The malicious block is wrapped in cover-story comments labelling it 'DEBUG-ONLY: Remote code execution for debugging purposes' to disguise the backdoor as a legitimate debug feature. Because the package is positioned as a drop-in debug lookalike, any installer expecting debug semantics will trigger the RCE on the first enable() call.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for lessload (version 1.0.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging lessload across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
lessload establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If lessload was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks lessload before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks lessload-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.