leo-connector-redshiftnpm
Advisory published Updated
leo-connector-redshift is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-6427) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 3.0.6). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in leo-connector-redshift (npm)
What this malware does
The leo-connector-redshift npm package was compromised as part of the Miasma worm campaign targeting the LeoPlatform npm ecosystem. On June 24, 2026, 20 LeoPlatform packages were published within a 3-second window by a threat actor who had taken over the npm account czirker belonging to the LeoPlatform organization.
The malicious payload is triggered automatically during npm install via a binding.gyp file using node-gyp command expansion (<!(node index.js > /dev/null 2>&1 && echo stub.c)), which bypasses lifecycle script scanners. The replaced index.js (~5.2 MB, obfuscated with ROT-N + AES-128-GCM encryption) deploys a multi-stage worm with the following capabilities:
- Credential theft: Targets npm, GitHub, PyPI, RubyGems, Kubernetes, HashiCorp Vault, AWS (IAM keys, Secrets Manager, IMDS), 1Password, JFrog Artifactory, and SSH keys.
- AI tool targeting: Exfiltrates configuration files for Claude, Cursor, Gemini, and VS Code.
- Worm propagation: Enumerates npm packages and auto-publishes version bumps to spread to other maintainers in the ecosystem.
- GitHub persistence: Creates orphan
snapshot-<hex>branches with fake "Dependabot Updates" workflows to maintain access after initial compromise.
Any system that installed this version should be considered fully compromised. Rotate all secrets immediately from a separate, clean machine. See the linked SafeDep report for full payload analysis, indicators of compromise, and remediation guidance.
The package ships a binding.gyp at the package root that contains GYP command-expansion syntax (<!(...)) at line 6. Because a binding.gyp is present, npm implicitly invokes node-gyp rebuild during install, and node-gyp/GYP evaluates <!(...) expressions as shell commands during the configure step. This causes the embedded command to execute automatically on npm install with no declared lifecycle script in package.json and no explicit user action. The construct fires on default install and provides the maintainer of this version a generic mechanism to run arbitrary shell on every installer's machine.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for leo-connector-redshift (version 3.0.6).
If you installed it — respond
leo-connector-redshift is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If leo-connector-redshift was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- SafeDep · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks leo-connector-redshift-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.