leo-connector-redshiftnpm
leo-connector-redshift is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-6427) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 3.0.6). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in leo-connector-redshift (npm)
What this malware does
The leo-connector-redshift npm package was compromised as part of the Miasma worm campaign targeting the LeoPlatform npm ecosystem. On June 24, 2026, 20 LeoPlatform packages were published within a 3-second window by a threat actor who had taken over the npm account czirker belonging to the LeoPlatform organization.
The malicious payload is triggered automatically during npm install via a binding.gyp file using node-gyp command expansion (<!(node index.js > /dev/null 2>&1 && echo stub.c)), which bypasses lifecycle script scanners. The replaced index.js (~5.2 MB, obfuscated with ROT-N + AES-128-GCM encryption) deploys a multi-stage worm with the following capabilities:
- Credential theft: Targets npm, GitHub, PyPI, RubyGems, Kubernetes, HashiCorp Vault, AWS (IAM keys, Secrets Manager, IMDS), 1Password, JFrog Artifactory, and SSH keys.
- AI tool targeting: Exfiltrates configuration files for Claude, Cursor, Gemini, and VS Code.
- Worm propagation: Enumerates npm packages and auto-publishes version bumps to spread to other maintainers in the ecosystem.
- GitHub persistence: Creates orphan
snapshot-<hex>branches with fake "Dependabot Updates" workflows to maintain access after initial compromise.
Any system that installed this version should be considered fully compromised. Rotate all secrets immediately from a separate, clean machine. See the linked SafeDep report for full payload analysis, indicators of compromise, and remediation guidance.
The package ships a binding.gyp at the package root that contains GYP command-expansion syntax (<!(...)) at line 6. Because a binding.gyp is present, npm implicitly invokes node-gyp rebuild during install, and node-gyp/GYP evaluates <!(...) expressions as shell commands during the configure step. This causes the embedded command to execute automatically on npm install with no declared lifecycle script in package.json and no explicit user action. The construct fires on default install and provides the maintainer of this version a generic mechanism to run arbitrary shell on every installer's machine.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for leo-connector-redshift (version 3.0.6). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging leo-connector-redshift across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
leo-connector-redshift is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If leo-connector-redshift was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks leo-connector-redshift before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- SafeDep · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks leo-connector-redshift-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.