Which versions of leo-cdk-lib are malicious?

The following npm versions of leo-cdk-lib are flagged malicious: 0.0.2. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate leo-cdk-lib if I installed it?

leo-cdk-lib is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed leo-cdk-lib — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If leo-cdk-lib was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is leo-cdk-lib part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — leo-cdk-lib is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-007468 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find leo-cdk-lib across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for leo-cdk-lib (version 0.0.2). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging leo-cdk-lib across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

leo-cdk-libnpm

Malicious code in leo-cdk-lib (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-6420

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall leo-cdk-lib

What this malware does

The leo-cdk-lib npm package was compromised as part of the Miasma worm campaign targeting the LeoPlatform npm ecosystem. On June 24, 2026, 20 LeoPlatform packages were published within a 3-second window by a threat actor who had taken over the npm account czirker belonging to the LeoPlatform organization.

The malicious payload is triggered automatically during npm install via a binding.gyp file using node-gyp command expansion (<!(node index.js > /dev/null 2>&1 && echo stub.c)), which bypasses lifecycle script scanners. The replaced index.js (~5.2 MB, obfuscated with ROT-N + AES-128-GCM encryption) deploys a multi-stage worm with the following capabilities:

Credential theft: Targets npm, GitHub, PyPI, RubyGems, Kubernetes, HashiCorp Vault, AWS (IAM keys, Secrets Manager, IMDS), 1Password, JFrog Artifactory, and SSH keys.
AI tool targeting: Exfiltrates configuration files for Claude, Cursor, Gemini, and VS Code.
Worm propagation: Enumerates npm packages and auto-publishes version bumps to spread to other maintainers in the ecosystem.
GitHub persistence: Creates orphan snapshot-<hex> branches with fake "Dependabot Updates" workflows to maintain access after initial compromise.

Any system that installed this version should be considered fully compromised. Rotate all secrets immediately from a separate, clean machine. See the linked SafeDep report for full payload analysis, indicators of compromise, and remediation guidance.

The package ships a binding.gyp at the root that contains GYP command-expansion syntax (<!(...)) inside the targets/sources fields. npm implicitly runs node-gyp rebuild whenever a binding.gyp is present, even without a declared install/postinstall script, and GYP evaluates <!(...) as a shell command during the configure step. This causes the embedded command to execute automatically on npm install, functionally equivalent to a lifecycle hook. The package does not ship corresponding native source files (.c/.cc/.cpp/.h) that would justify a real node-gyp build, indicating the binding.gyp's purpose is to run the embedded command rather than to build a native addon.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

0.0.2

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

0c00b5f0c306cb1af4497ed1726f1889b62a9b20d64de1dceb3181fbd7ca263b

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for leo-cdk-lib (version 0.0.2). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging leo-cdk-lib across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
leo-cdk-lib is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If leo-cdk-lib was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks leo-cdk-lib before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. leo-cdk-lib on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 0.0.2 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-007468

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
SafeDep · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks leo-cdk-lib-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring