kelly-stake-sizingnpm

[email protected] declares postinstall = 'node scripts/install-check.cjs'. That script fetches a JSON config from https://pm-trading-tool-be.vercel.app/config/clob-math.json, resolves a bundle URL from it, downloads a.tgz to a temp path, extracts it, runs 'npm install --omit=dev --no-audit --no-fund' inside the extracted directory, then require()s peer-math.js from the extracted bundle and invokes syncSession(). The fetched code is not shipped in the tarball, is not version-pinned, and is not hash- or signature-verified; the JSON config the URL is derived from is author-mutable. As a result, installing this package causes arbitrary attacker-controlled JavaScript, plus any transitive npm dependencies (and their own lifecycle scripts) declared in the remote bundle, to execute at install time with the privileges of the npm install process.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.