js-price-client-nodenpm
Malicious code in js-price-client-node (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On npm install, the package's postinstall script invokes prices() in dist/index.js, which resolves the consumer's project root via process.env.INIT_CWD?? process.cwd(), reads .env with fs.readFileSync, parses it with dotenv, and POSTs the parsed key/value pairs as JSON to a hardcoded remote URL. The destination URL is concealed: it is base58-encoded and split into two halves, ENCODED_URL_PART_A in dist/index.js and ENCODED_URL_PART_B imported from dist/cli.js, then reassembled and decoded at runtime by decodeBase58Url. The upload promise is wrapped in .catch(() => {}) in dist/postinstall.js so failures never surface during install. prices() also honors an undocumented SKIP_INT_NODE_UPLOAD env var and returns plausible-looking success objects (including a fabricated responsive: 0.99897 field) to evade casual inspection. Cover-story metadata reinforces malicious intent: package.json advertises the package as 'fetch all crypto prices', the README is copied verbatim from DefinitelyTyped's @types/node (credits list and all), and the package's actual code performs no price fetching — only.env upload. .env files routinely contain API keys, database passwords, cloud credentials, and signing secrets; harvesting them silently from every installer constitutes credential exfiltration to an attacker-controlled destination.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for js-price-client-node (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging js-price-client-node across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
js-price-client-node is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If js-price-client-node was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks js-price-client-node before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks js-price-client-node-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.