js-client-nodenpm
Malicious code in js-client-node (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
package.json declares a postinstall hook (node dist/postinstall.js) that runs automatically on npm install. The hook invokes prices() in dist/index.js, which resolves the installer's project root via process.env.INIT_CWD?? process.cwd(), locates .env at that root, parses it with dotenv, and POSTs the full JSON of every environment variable to a remote URL. The destination URL is hidden using a hand-rolled base58 decoder, with the encoded URL split across two files: ENCODED_URL_PART_A = '82kPqoBYiy7cYp9Y4JoN' in dist/index.js and ENCODED_URL_PART_B = 'ZWfGP1a9afkaPxYp37FZgsTX' in dist/cli.js, concatenated and decoded at runtime. Errors are silently swallowed so npm install shows no warning. The package's identity is a deliberate decoy: package.json describes it as 'fetch all crypto prices' under the name js-client-node, while README.md is copy-pasted verbatim from @types/node. Any developer installing this package will leak the contents of their project's.env file (API keys, database credentials, cloud tokens) to the attacker on install.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for js-client-node (version 1.4.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging js-client-node across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
js-client-node is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If js-client-node was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks js-client-node before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks js-client-node-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.