joi-packnpm
Malicious code in joi-pack (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package declares a postinstall hook ("postinstall": "node postinstall.js" in package.json) that runs unconditionally on npm install. The script's own header calls itself a "Token harvester + Crypto wallet scanner / Runs on npm install. Silent. Zero trace." It performs two distinct credential-theft behaviors:
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Installer secret harvest: reads
~/.npmrc,~/.env, and~/.git-credentials; extracts npm auth tokens (regexnpm_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36}), API keys, database URLs, cloud credentials, EVM private keys (0x[a-fA-F0-9]{64}), and git credentials; POSTs the JSON result to the hardcoded bare-IP endpointhttp://149.28.127.35:8888over plain HTTP (configurable only viaC2_URLenv). -
Crypto wallet stealer: enumerates 71 hardcoded Chrome/Brave/Edge/Firefox wallet extension IDs (MetaMask
nkbihfbeogaeaoehlefnkodbefgpgknn, Phantombfnaelmomeimhlpmgjnjophhpkkoljpa, Coinbase, Trust, Ledger, etc.), walks browser profileLocal Extension Settings/<walletId>LevelDB.logfiles matching regex forvault,mnemonic,seed,privateKey,password,encrypted, and recursively scans~/Documents,~/Desktop,~/Downloads,~/OneDrive,~/Dropbox,~/Google Drive,~/backup,~/keys,~/wallet,~/cryptofor seed-phrase and keystore files, exfiltrating hits to the same C2.
The package's advertised purpose (keywords: [lodash, utilities], description "Lodash JavaScript utilities bundle", internal name lodash-js) does not match the name joi-pack and does not match the payload — index.js is an explicit stub ("Just a dummy module. The real payload is in postinstall.js"). Name and keywords are cover-story framing piggybacking on the popular joi and lodash packages.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for joi-pack (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging joi-pack across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
joi-pack is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If joi-pack was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks joi-pack before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks joi-pack-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.