Which versions of ishowfeet20 are malicious?

The following npm versions of ishowfeet20 are flagged malicious: 1.1.7, 1.7.7, 2.0.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate ishowfeet20 if I installed it?

ishowfeet20 establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.

I already installed ishowfeet20 — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If ishowfeet20 was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is ishowfeet20 part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — ishowfeet20 is associated with the GHSA-vpf6-vh9c-53c6, IN-MAL-2026-010026, IN-MAL-2026-010024, IN-MAL-2026-010025 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find ishowfeet20 across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for ishowfeet20 (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging ishowfeet20 across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

ishowfeet20npm

Malicious code in ishowfeet20 (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-10323

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall ishowfeet20

What this malware does

The tarball ships auto-publish.sh, a script that republishes the same payload under ~100 distinct npm names (ishowfeet1-ishowfeet20, nottuff1-nottuff30, abuden*, imillegal*, ratelimitsucks*, etc/) by rewriting package.json.name and running npm publish --silent in a loop — namespace-spam infrastructure shipped inside the package itself. The package's declared main is sw.js, a browser Service Worker (importScripts('./8cfc2/hgshm.js'), self.addEventListener('install'|'activate'|'fetch'|'message')) that throws immediately if loaded from Node. The shipped assets are a heavily obfuscated Ultraviolet/bare-mux web-proxy frontend with an index.html themed as "Riverbend Tutoring" that hides a popunder redirect to https://abdct.com/ on click/keydown/touchstart. package.json declares no preinstall/install/postinstall/prepare hooks, and require('ishowfeet9') from Node fails before any code runs, so a Node installer experiences no auto-execution. The harm is registry abuse (mass-publication of a misleading name family) and a browser-side proxy/popunder served to whoever later loads these static assets — not installer-side compromise. Routing to human review for namespace-abuse adjudication.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Malicious versions

3 flagged

1.1.71.7.72.0.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

c3e0b6da2b5946fa489fcbe2f504a908eaba801f51b021351626ee87dd7c12e7

57470f610cd7e988daef50a3a2587778f3dce2cb1584572d4a1795876f9cf6fe

83337f5fc8b3ea8c7907d8f2f6e07acc7eb8f8e93e14762cca52fc28b18cbc8b

d776e667a020ecf638e98646e181b86254fd0d5439aaab9256134c0d0bda806b

Detection & response playbook

Backdoor / remote access

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for ishowfeet20 (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging ishowfeet20 across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
ishowfeet20 establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If ishowfeet20 was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks ishowfeet20 before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. ishowfeet20 on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 1.1.7, 1.7.7, 2.0.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

GHSA-vpf6-vh9c-53c6IN-MAL-2026-010026IN-MAL-2026-010024IN-MAL-2026-010025

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks ishowfeet20-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring