iphousenpm
iphouse is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-10957) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 1.0.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in iphouse (npm)
What this malware does
The iphouse package was published to the npm registry by user 'jonothhu' (maintainer email [email protected]) as one of 19 packages in a dependency-confusion campaign targeting the 'markscan', 'akrai', and 'iphouse' namespaces, published in both unscoped and scoped (@scope/name) forms so that a misconfigured resolver installs the public lookalike instead of an intended private/internal dependency. Each package self-describes as an 'AUTHORIZED SECURITY RESEARCH CANARY' (static token PATHC-CANARY-2026, contact [email protected]), but ships an unconsented install-time beacon and provides no legitimate functionality.
The package declares a postinstall hook ("node postinstall.js") that executes automatically on npm install. The bundled postinstall.js collects host reconnaissance - the package/canary name, the static token 'PATHC-CANARY-2026', an event label, a UTC timestamp, the Node.js version, the current working directory, the platform, and os.hostname() - and exfiltrates it via HTTPS POST to a hardcoded anonymous dead-drop at https://webhook.site/129cb2ee-ba08-4b3c-989c-270dc0030350 (the same collector across all 19 packages). Request errors are swallowed.
The self-attestation of 'authorized security research' present in the package metadata is unverifiable and does not change the disposition: the package performs unconsented telemetry collection and exfiltration at install time to an anonymous collector, matching the behavior of a dependency-confusion reconnaissance beacon. Install-time behavior and the shared collector endpoint were confirmed by static analysis of a sample spanning all three namespaces and both scoped and unscoped variants.
[email protected] ships a postinstall.js lifecycle script that runs unconditionally on npm install. It collects installer host identifiers (hostname, platform, current working directory, node version, timestamp) and POSTs them as JSON to a hardcoded webhook.site endpoint (https://webhook.site/129cb2ee-ba08-4b3c-989c-270dc0030350) controlled by the package author. There is no opt-in, no disclosure to the installer, and no legitimate package functionality accompanying the beacon — the package's only behavior is host-metadata exfiltration to an anonymous author-controlled endpoint.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for iphouse (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging iphouse across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
iphouse is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If iphouse was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks iphouse before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- SafeDep · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks iphouse-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.