intl-adsnpm
Malicious code in intl-ads (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On npm install, the package's scripts.preinstall runs poc.js which collects hostname, username, full network configuration (ipconfig/ip a/resolv.conf), id/whoami /all, git remote, parent package.json, and CI configuration files (.gitlab-ci.yml,.github/workflows, Jenkinsfile, azure-pipelines.yml). It then iterates process.env and harvests any variable whose name contains AWS, AZURE, GITHUB, GITLAB, JENKINS, NPM, TOKEN, CI, BUILD, etc. — capturing values, not just names — and POSTs the JSON payload to d8a5d9pon5bugoc35cngp9hcregcqyezu.oast.me over HTTPS, with a DNS callback as a secondary channel. The package self-describes as authorized bug-bounty research targeting Walmart's private namespace via dependency confusion, but the public npm registry has no scope restriction: any developer or CI system that resolves this name will execute the recon and leak credentials. The OAST destination is an Interactsh collector, not a Walmart-owned endpoint, so harvested data leaves any authorized scope. Concrete installer harm: AWS/Azure/GitHub/GitLab/npm tokens present in CI environment are exfiltrated; host fingerprinting enables follow-on attacks.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for intl-ads (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging intl-ads across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
intl-ads is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If intl-ads was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks intl-ads before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks intl-ads-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.