intl-ad-routingnpm
Malicious code in intl-ad-routing (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
[email protected] is a dependency-confusion squat targeting an internal @livingdesign/react namespace. On npm install, the package's preinstall hook (poc.js) executes shell commands to enumerate the installer's environment (ipconfig /all on Windows, ip a && cat /etc/resolv.conf on Linux) and collects hostname, username, install directory, network interfaces, the full list of process.env keys, and every npm_* environment variable (which can include npm registry auth tokens / _authToken values). The collected JSON is POSTed over HTTPS to d8a5d9pon5bugoc35cngp9hcregcqyezu.oast.me (an interactsh out-of-band collector), and a DNS callback encoding hostname+username is also issued. The package's own description states it is a 'Dependency Confusion PoC' for a bug-bounty program, but the lifecycle code runs on any installer that resolves this public version in place of the intended private package — without the installer's consent — and ships their host identifiers and potentially registry credentials to a third-party collector.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for intl-ad-routing (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging intl-ad-routing across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
intl-ad-routing is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If intl-ad-routing was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks intl-ad-routing before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks intl-ad-routing-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.