int_sezzle_sfranpm
Malicious code in int_sezzle_sfra (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
package.json declares preinstall: node index.js, which fires automatically on npm install. index.js collects host reconnaissance from the installer machine — hostname, OS info, username, uid/gid, shell, home directory, current working directory, and the output of whoami and id shelled out via child_process.exec — and POSTs the resulting JSON to a hardcoded Burp Collaborator OAST subdomain at https://1mopc72u2pqhsphbd3rmzirm9df43wrl.oastify.com/detox56. The package name mirrors the Salesforce Commerce Cloud (SFRA) cartridge naming convention used by Sezzle's internal int_sezzle_sfra integration cartridge; combined with empty author/description/license metadata and the install-time OAST beacon, this matches the canonical dependency-confusion pattern targeting a private vendor cartridge name. Installing this package causes unconsented exfiltration of installer identity and shell-command output to an attacker-controlled callback host.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for int_sezzle_sfra (version 25.2.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging int_sezzle_sfra across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
int_sezzle_sfra is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If int_sezzle_sfra was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks int_sezzle_sfra before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks int_sezzle_sfra-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.