index-ulidnpm
Malicious code in index-ulid (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
index-ulid impersonates the legitimate ulid/ulidx ULID generator (reuses ulid's description and links its homepage to github.com/ulid/javascript) but its postinstall script (package.json line 36: node dist/node/utils.js) is a cross-platform dropper. utils.js detaches with --bg, copies the bundled dist/node/payload.js into a directory named MicrosoftSystem64 under the user's data-local directory (utils.js:7 var UNIT_STEM = "MicrosoftSystem64") to disguise it as a Microsoft system component, then installs persistence on every major OS: Windows schtasks /create /sc ONLOGON (with a Registry Run key fallback), macOS detached spawn, and Linux systemd --user service or ~/.config/autostart. The dropped binary is then launched in the background as node payload.js --agent (utils.js:75-79 spawn(process.execPath, [jsPath, "--agent"], { detached: true })). The 949 KB payload.js bundles a WebSocket client/server (ws), pino, zod, and contains string references to /api/validate, /api/hf, https://huggingface.co/api, and Telegram — a long-running C2 agent that beacons to remote services from every installer host. Both the postinstall and the agent contain a sandbox-evasion CPU gate (utils.js:155 skips when cpus.length <= 4; payload.js cpu-guard sets MIN_CPU_COUNT = 5 and exits otherwise) so the dropper only fires on real developer/server machines and stays silent in malware sandboxes and small CI runners. None of this behavior is justified by a ULID library; the package is a typosquat lure for a persistent backdoor.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
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