in-installnpm
in-install is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13982) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 99.9.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in in-install (npm)
What this malware does
[email protected] declares its ltidisafe dependency as an HTTPS tarball URL hosted on a Google Cloud Storage bucket (https://ltidi.storage.googleapis.com/depenconf/ltidisafe-3.6.9.tgz) rather than a registry-resolved package. Running npm install in-install fetches that tarball and installs it into the installer's node_modules, executing whatever install/import-time code it ships. The bucket path is mutable by whoever controls it, is not subject to npm registry review, and is not pinned to a registry-audited artifact, so the bytes delivered at install time can be changed at any moment without a version bump. The package's own index.js is an empty export; the sole observable effect of installing it is pulling arbitrary off-registry code into the installer's environment.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for in-install (version 99.9.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging in-install across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove in-install from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If in-install was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks in-install before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks in-install-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.