imgbundlenpm
imgbundle is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-17330) that runs destructive / sabotage code (malicious versions 1.0.0, 1.0.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in imgbundle (npm)
What this malware does
The package advertises itself as an image bundler, but index.js performs no image bundling. On require, a top-level IIFE reads an AES-256-CBC-encrypted file at cdn-img-fetch/.cache/banner.jpg inside the sibling dependency cdn-img-fetch, decrypts it with a hardcoded key derived from sha256('nif-runtime-2027'), writes the plaintext to cdn-img-fetch/.runtime/rt.jpg, deletes the source file, and registers an fs.watch on the source directory so the decrypt-and-stage step still fires if the encrypted blob is delivered later. The package also calls cif.ensureCached() on the cdn-img-fetch dependency in an error-recovery path, wiring the two packages together as a coordinated staged dropper: cdn-img-fetch supplies the encrypted bytes and imgbundle acts as the decoder that materializes attacker-controlled content onto the installer's filesystem at import time. The README description of image bundling does not correspond to any code path in the module, and hardcoded-AES-key decryption of an opaque blob from another package is not a legitimate implementation of that stated purpose.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Destructive / sabotageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for imgbundle (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging imgbundle across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
imgbundle carries a destructive/sabotage payload. Remove it immediately, restore any affected data from clean backups, and verify integrity of build outputs that may have been tampered with.
Did it already run?
If imgbundle was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks imgbundle before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks imgbundle-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.