idlidosanpm
idlidosa is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-4581) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious versions 1.0.0, 1.0.1, 1.0.2…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in idlidosa (npm)
What this malware does
The package is purpose-built tooling to defeat exam-proctoring / lockdown software, with multiple installer-machine integrity harms triggered when the user runs the documented idlidosa start command:
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Binary masquerade as Microsoft software:
dist/cli/index.js(~line 290) copies the bundledelectron.exetomsedgewebview2.exeand uses bundledrceditto overwrite its Windows version resources to claimCompanyName=Microsoft CorporationandProductName=Microsoft Edge WebView2 Runtime. The guard process additionally setsprocess.title = "Windows Audio Device Graph Isolation". An administrator auditing the host sees what appears to be a Microsoft component but is an unsigned Electron app under this package's control. -
Persistence as fake Edge updater:
installResurrector(~line 330) registers a Windows Scheduled Task namedMicrosoftEdgeWebView2Updatethat runs every 1 minute viaschtasks /create... /sc MINUTE /mo 1 /f, re-spawning a launcher written to%APPDATA%/Idlidosa/resurrect.js. The task name impersonates a legitimate Microsoft Edge update job. -
Anti-detection watchdog:
cli/guard.cjscarries self-incriminating comments stating the 1500ms restart delay isfast enough to beat TestPad's 30s scanand that it runs asnode.exe (which lockdown software rarely kills). -
Process-wide TLS validation disabled:
dist/shared/index.js(~line 187) setsprocess.env.NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED = "0"at module load, disabling TLS certificate validation for every HTTPS call made by the host Node process for the lifetime of that process — not just calls made by this package. Subsequent traffic (including screenshots of the user's screen and bundled API keys) is sent over un-validated TLS and is exposed to MITM on the installer's network. -
Bundled decryptable Groq API key pool:
shared/keys.jsonships nine AES-256-GCM-encrypted Groq API keys whose decryption key issha256("pageai-pool-v2")(literal byte array inshared/crypto.ts), so any installer can decrypt them. These are the author's own keys (author self-harm), but they are used as the default channel for sending the user's screen captures over the TLS-disabled connection.
The combination of Microsoft-impersonation on disk, Microsoft-impersonation as a scheduled task, watchdog comments documenting evasion intent, and global TLS weakening constitutes deliberate harm to the integrity of any host this is installed and run on.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for idlidosa (5 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging idlidosa across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
idlidosa is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove idlidosa, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If idlidosa was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks idlidosa before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks idlidosa-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.