Which versions of ichigo-baileys are malicious?

The following npm versions of ichigo-baileys are flagged malicious: 1.0.0, 1.0.5. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate ichigo-baileys if I installed it?

ichigo-baileys is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed ichigo-baileys — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If ichigo-baileys was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.

Is ichigo-baileys part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — ichigo-baileys is associated with the GHSA-q66v-22v7-2qj9 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find ichigo-baileys across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for ichigo-baileys (2 malicious versions).

Malicious package

ichigo-baileysnpm

Advisory published Oct 19, 2026Updated Oct 19, 2026

ichigo-baileys is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-17445) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.0.0, 1.0.5). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in ichigo-baileys (npm)

MAL-2026-17445

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall ichigo-baileys

What this malware does

This package is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library (npm) and belongs to the "PhantomSub" family described by OX Security in September 2026: the publisher injected code that, without the installer asking, uses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to subscribe that account to WhatsApp Channels (newsletters) the publisher chose, by sending the WhatsApp w:mex FOLLOW query (query_id 7871414976211147) for each target channel JID.

package/lib/Socket/messages-recv.js lines 45-67 define a char-code decoder (qvnr) and use it to build the channel JID 120363428355171197@newsletter and the method names newsletterFollow and newsletterMute (cited line 56: const pzha = qvnr([), so neither the JID nor the method names appear in the source as text. Lines 1119-1134, in the connection.update handler, wait 30 seconds after the connection opens, then call sock[pzha](id) (follow) and, 3 seconds later, sock[wjcf](id) (mute) for the JID.

package/lib/Socket/newsletter.js lines 86-112 add a second routine, autoJoinChannels, that 30 seconds after the connection opens sends FOLLOW and then MUTE for the plain-literal JID 120363402057133599@newsletter. The code is derived from noxleyss (MAL-2026-17402), whose name it still uses in package/lib/Utils/generics.js.

Line numbers refer to version 1.0.5; the same code is present in every published version listed under affected.

Static review of the published tarball(s) found no code that sends WhatsApp credentials or session keys off-host, no install-time payload (the only install hook is Baileys' stock Node.js version check in engine-requirements.js), and no persistence; the payload runs when an application creates a WhatsApp socket with the library. The harm is the covert use of the victim's account to inflate the publisher's channel subscribers.

SHA-256 of the published npm tarball(s): 1.0.0: 5fe50ba443b5033315bdec46b80ea41bb3894e83f8d2f3343233cd0cbaacee16; 1.0.5: 67e493bf91f61995c79592a4148f290339ef16910f3a5417d2d7d2b47ef36a65.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Malicious versions

2 flagged

1.0.01.0.5

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

4d9b532ccc541c0063643c98239941da76edf338f196991dc80af841ff94a2d7

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for ichigo-baileys (2 malicious versions).
If you installed it — respond
ichigo-baileys is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If ichigo-baileys was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.

Frequently asked questions

No. ichigo-baileys on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 1.0.0, 1.0.5 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

GHSA-q66v-22v7-2qj9

References

Credits

Rising Sun Solutions LLC · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks ichigo-baileys-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

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