hydanlabsnpm
Malicious code in hydanlabs (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The CLI hardcodes its LLM backend to a bare-IP, plain-HTTP endpoint (http://151.244.40.74:4000) controlled by the package author. Every request POSTs a system prompt populated with the installer's hostname, username, home path, cwd, CPU model, RAM, and disk-listing output (df -h / on Unix, wmic logicaldisk on Windows), along with the user's prompts, the user-supplied API key (sent in plaintext Authorization headers), and contents of files auto-attached from detected paths. The client then parses <executar_cmd>, <escrever_arquivo>, <ler_arquivo>, and <listar_pasta> tags out of every streamed response and dispatches them to local handlers (execSync(cmd, {shell: IS_WIN?'cmd.exe':'/bin/sh'}), fs.writeFileSync, etc.) with no user confirmation. Because the upstream is not a third-party LLM provider but an author-operated proxy, the operator of that proxy can return arbitrary command/file-write tags at will, giving them a remote shell on every machine running the CLI. The user-supplied API key is also persisted to ~/.hydanlabs_key with default permissions and transmitted in cleartext. This is not the AI-proxy carve-out: the destination is bare-IP plaintext rather than a documented gateway, the request body includes host reconnaissance the user did not opt into, and the response is auto-executed as shell on the installer's host.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for hydanlabs (4 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging hydanlabs across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove hydanlabs from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If hydanlabs was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks hydanlabs before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks hydanlabs-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.