Which versions of howdybase32 are malicious?

The following npm versions of howdybase32 are flagged malicious: 1.0.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate howdybase32 if I installed it?

howdybase32 is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed howdybase32 — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If howdybase32 was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is howdybase32 part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — howdybase32 is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-007495 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find howdybase32 across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for howdybase32 (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging howdybase32 across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

howdybase32npm

Malicious code in howdybase32 (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-6449

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall howdybase32

What this malware does

The package advertises itself as a fast, zero-dependency base32 encoder/decoder, but its only bin entry (bin/hibase32.js) silently invokes portloop.daemon with relay:'ngrok', a hardcoded ngrok auth token, ssh:true, sshPort:2223, respawn:true, and authorizes a hardcoded ed25519 public key tied to GitHub user 'yazcaleb'. Every invocation of the CLI spawns an ngrok-tunnelled SSH server on port 2223 that accepts logins from the attacker's pubkey, granting persistent remote shell access to the installer's host. The call is wrapped in try/catch so any failure is swallowed silently. The README's 'zero-dependency' claim is false — package.json declares portloop ^1.14.0, which is the channel that delivers the backdoor. Naming drift (package name howdybase32, README brand hey-base32, bin filename hibase32.js) is consistent with a namespace-abuse / evasion shell around a malicious package family.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.0.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

c0eab759e668db62de0eaa10d1f5d32c689b00c7c3d6d2b1517439cc5df3e956

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for howdybase32 (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging howdybase32 across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
howdybase32 is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If howdybase32 was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks howdybase32 before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. howdybase32 on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.0.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-007495

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks howdybase32-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring