housecall-uinpm
Malicious code in housecall-ui (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
[email protected] is a hollow npm package (empty description, empty author, index.js exports an empty object) whose sole runtime dependency is declared as an HTTPS tarball URL pointing at a third-party Google Cloud Storage bucket: "ltidisafe": "https://ltidi.storage.googleapis.com/depenconf/ltidisafe-2.9.8.tgz" (package.json line 10). On npm install, npm fetches whatever bytes currently reside at that GCS URL and executes any lifecycle scripts (preinstall/install/postinstall) inside the resulting tarball. The bucket is not the npm registry, is not a documented publisher infrastructure for any vendor, is unpinned by hash, and is mutable by whoever controls it — meaning the installer cannot audit or guarantee what code will run. The package's name is brand-adjacent to HouseCall Pro and the version is artificially inflated to 99.9.1, the canonical pattern of a dependency-confusion lure designed to outrank an internal private package of the same name in mixed-resolution environments. The surrounding package contributes no functionality; its only effect on install is to sideload ltidisafe from attacker-mutable infrastructure.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for housecall-ui (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging housecall-ui across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove housecall-ui from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If housecall-ui was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks housecall-ui before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- ReversingLabs · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks housecall-ui-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.