homestack-cheernpm
homestack-cheer is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-16333) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 1.1.9). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in homestack-cheer (npm)
What this malware does
The package is published as homestack-cheer with description 'JS lib support cheerleading', but the README and the UMD build (dist/my-lib.umd.js) present it as a trivial hello-world 'greet' library. The ESM entrypoint declared in package.json 'module' (src/index.js) and src/env_load.js each end with new Function(atob('<~180KB base64>')).call(this), decoding an obfuscated second-stage payload via a runtime string-shuffle routine. When a downstream project bundles this package with webpack/rollup, the ESM path is resolved and the hidden payload is embedded into the resulting application bundle and executed in end-users' browsers. The decoded payload checks window.location for the substring 'checkout' and, when a Stripe payment element iframe (#stripe-payment-element iframe) is present, hides the real Stripe iframe, clears the disabled state on the place-order button, and injects a look-alike iframe with id __privateStripeFrame84331 to intercept card input. The divergence between the benign main (UMD greet) and the malicious module (ESM Function(atob(...))) constitutes deliberate dual-entrypoint smuggling designed to evade casual review of the package's headline file.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for homestack-cheer (version 1.1.9). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging homestack-cheer across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove homestack-cheer from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If homestack-cheer was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks homestack-cheer before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks homestack-cheer-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.