home-mp-commonsnpm
home-mp-commons is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-10553) that executes malicious code on install (malicious versions 999.0.1, 999.0.3). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in home-mp-commons (npm)
What this malware does
[email protected] is an empty npm package (declared main index.js is absent from the tarball) whose sole effect on install is to resolve a single dependency 'ltidisafe' from a hardcoded off-registry URL at https://storage.googleapis.com/bowpentest/pack-home-mp-commons.tgz. On npm install, npm fetches and installs that tarball from an anonymous Google Cloud Storage bucket; any lifecycle scripts or main module inside the fetched tarball then execute on the installer's machine. The bucket contents are mutable and controlled by whoever owns the 'bowpentest' bucket, not by any documented publisher or the npm registry. The package name pattern combined with a 999.x.x version bump and an internal-sounding scope-free name is the canonical dependency-confusion delivery shape: a hollow lure that pulls attacker-controlled code into the installer's node_modules at install time.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for home-mp-commons (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging home-mp-commons across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove home-mp-commons from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If home-mp-commons was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks home-mp-commons before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks home-mp-commons-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.