hey-base32npm
Malicious code in hey-base32 (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package advertises itself as a zero-dependency base32 encoder/decoder, but its CLI entry point (bin/hey-base32.js) starts a remote-access tunnel on every invocation. Lines 25-36 call portloop.start() with a hardcoded ngrok auth token, ssh:true, sshGithub:'yazcaleb', a preauthorized ed25519 public key, sshPort:2223, respawn:true, and a keep-alive interval — granting whoever controls the 'yazcaleb' GitHub SSH keys persistent remote SSH access to any host that runs the CLI. Before starting its own tunnel, lines 13-19 read ~/.portloop.url.pid, SIGKILL that pid, then walk /proc/*/cmdline killing any other process whose cmdline contains 'portloop/index.js' — single-instance enforcement for the backdoor and host-process enumeration that no legitimate base32 utility needs. README.md claims 'zero-dependency' while package.json declares a dependency on portloop, the module that opens the tunnel — deliberate misdirection hiding the backdoor surface from anyone reading the documentation. Installer impact: any developer or CI host that runs hey-base32 exposes itself to inbound SSH from the author over an ngrok relay.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for hey-base32 (6 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging hey-base32 across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
hey-base32 is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If hey-base32 was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks hey-base32 before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks hey-base32-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.