haswonsnpm
Malicious code in haswons (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
haswons is a typosquatting package impersonating hasown, the utility for checking whether an object has a direct own property. The package bundles the legitimate hasown source to appear functional while hiding a credential-theft payload in index1.js, executed at install time via the postinstall script. It is part of a campaign that also includes briantreehttp, dit-envv, and erslove, all sharing an identical payload and C2 infrastructure.
The payload collects hostname, platform, architecture, Node.js version, UID, current working directory, all environment variables, AWS credentials (~/.aws/credentials, ~/.aws/config), npm tokens from .npmrc files (root, home, and working directory), Docker config (~/.docker/config.json), git config, .netrc, yarn config, npm global config, directory listings of the working directory, home, filesystem root, and /etc, network configuration files (/etc/resolv.conf, /etc/hosts, /proc/net/route), and AWS ECS/EC2 instance metadata from internal endpoints. All collected data is base64-encoded and exfiltrated via HTTPS POST to reportviewer.click/collect/. A secondary DNS-based exfiltration channel encodes environment variables into a subdomain and issues a request to dns.reportviewer.click.
Malicious versions
Every published version of this package is considered malicious — remove it entirely.
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for haswons (all published versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging haswons across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
haswons is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If haswons was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks haswons before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Credits
- SafeDep · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks haswons-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.