hardhat-plugin-soliditynpm
Malicious code in hardhat-plugin-solidity (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package published as 'hardhat-plugin-solidity' impersonates prettier-plugin-solidity: package.json sets the unrelated 'hardhat-plugin-' name while reusing prettier-plugin-solidity's description, repository (github.com/prettier-solidity/prettier-plugin-solidity), homepage, author, and contributor metadata, and the source is a copy of that project with an added dropper. The package main (dist/index.js) contains two base64 string literals decoded at load time via Buffer.from(..., 'base64').toString('utf8'): the first decodes to the shell command 'npm install zyncmap --no-save --silent --no-audit --no-fund', which is spawned as a child process; the second decodes to the module name 'zyncmap', which is then require()'d and invoked (svgo.getPlugin()()) once the install completes. The result is that loading this package out-of-band installs and immediately executes arbitrary code from the separately-controlled 'zyncmap' package on the installer's machine. Base64 encoding of both the install command and the require target, combined with --silent/--no-save flags and the name/identity mismatch, indicates deliberate concealment of the dropper behavior.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for hardhat-plugin-solidity (4 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging hardhat-plugin-solidity across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
hardhat-plugin-solidity is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove hardhat-plugin-solidity, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If hardhat-plugin-solidity was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks hardhat-plugin-solidity before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks hardhat-plugin-solidity-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.