Which versions of hardhat-hold are malicious?

The following npm versions of hardhat-hold are flagged malicious: 2.0.1, 2.21.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate hardhat-hold if I installed it?

hardhat-hold is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed hardhat-hold — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If hardhat-hold was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is hardhat-hold part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — hardhat-hold is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-018343, IN-MAL-2026-018344 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find hardhat-hold across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for hardhat-hold (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging hardhat-hold across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

hardhat-holdnpm

hardhat-hold is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-14246) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 2.0.1, 2.21.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in hardhat-hold (npm)

MAL-2026-14246

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall hardhat-hold

What this malware does

The package's main entry index.js unconditionally requires./lib/config, which is a ~4MB obfuscator.io-style blob (string array of ~23,981 entries with a rotating decoder and hex-escaped literals). The readable identifiers inside that payload include execSync (child_process) and axios (HTTP client) — the local-execution and outbound-network primitives used by droppers and exfiltration stagers — and the payload runs at import time via a top-level IIFE. The wrapper index.js copies the pino logger API surface but never uses the config export; its only effect is to force the obfuscated blob to load on require(). The package name hardhat-hold is a one-token variant of the Ethereum tooling package hardhat, while the README impersonates the pino logger (including shields.io badges that still point at pino's repository), and package.json carries an unrelated boilerplate description about vulnerability management. The combination of name/README/description mismatch with an obfuscated import-time payload carrying shell-exec + HTTP primitives is the canonical typosquat-dropper shape.

Malicious versions

2 flagged

2.0.12.21.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

cc09d295042df8d7132dc5b79ae9d32ab77630db037521b333a44988aed7fac1

e961a4e9f774d02e73039b143503a3fff7cad6fdbf164123d76a3d5de53c667e

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for hardhat-hold (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging hardhat-hold across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
hardhat-hold is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If hardhat-hold was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks hardhat-hold before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. hardhat-hold on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 2.0.1, 2.21.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-018343IN-MAL-2026-018344

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks hardhat-hold-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

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