hardhat-capnpm
hardhat-cap is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13616) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 2.21.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in hardhat-cap (npm)
What this malware does
The package is published as hardhat-cap but its README, LICENSE, index.d.ts, and lib/proto.js / lib/tools.js are a verbatim copy of the pino logger, with author metadata pointing at jsonspack.com. index.js unconditionally does const config = require('./lib/config');, and lib/config.js is a ~4 MB single-line obfuscator.io-transformed module (rotated string array of ~23,931 entries, dual decoders, RC4+base64 string decoding, control-flow flattening) whose top-level IIFE self-invokes at load time. Requiring the package executes this opaque payload on the installer's host at import time; the surrounding pino code is unrelated cover. A logger has no need for a multi-megabyte obfuscated self-decoding blob, and the name/contents mismatch (Hardhat-themed name, pino source, obfuscated third module) is consistent with a typosquat lure that drops arbitrary code execution into consumers on require.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for hardhat-cap (version 2.21.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging hardhat-cap across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
hardhat-cap is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove hardhat-cap, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If hardhat-cap was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks hardhat-cap before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks hardhat-cap-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.