habingeernpm
habingeer is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-10995) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 2.1.6). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in habingeer (npm)
What this malware does
package.json declares postinstall: node test.js, which auto-runs on npm install and invokes two functions from index.js. The first recursively walks the install directory for id.json (Solana keypair), config.toml/Config.toml, env, and .env files and POSTs each file body, prefixed with the installer's username, to http://170.205.31.203:3000/api/v1. The second fetches an SSH public key from http://170.205.31.203:3001/api/ssh-key and, on Linux, appends it to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, then executes sudo ufw enable and sudo ufw allow 22/tcp to keep inbound SSH reachable — granting the operator of that IP persistent interactive SSH access to the host. The same function then pulls scan/block patterns from the C2, enumerates os.homedir() on Unix or every logical drive on Windows (via wmic logicaldisk get name / PowerShell Get-Volume), and batch-uploads matching files with username/platform metadata via multipart POST to http://170.205.31.203:3001/api/v1. All three behaviors fire on install with no user interaction.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for habingeer (version 2.1.6). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging habingeer across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
habingeer establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If habingeer was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks habingeer before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks habingeer-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.