greatcall-customers-commandapinpm
greatcall-customers-commandapi is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12065) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 99.0.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in greatcall-customers-commandapi (npm)
What this malware does
[email protected] is a dependency-confusion attack package. package.json self-describes as "Dependency confusion PoC" and declares preinstall, install, and postinstall lifecycle scripts all invoking node index.js. On any of the three install hooks, index.js collects host identifiers (os.hostname(), os.userInfo(), homedir, platform, cwd, network interfaces), captures the output of whoami and ls -la via child_process.execSync, and enumerates process.env filtering for credential-shaped keys matching /KEY|SECRET|TOKEN|PASS|AUTH|CRED|PRIVATE|AWS_|AZURE_|GCP_|GITHUB|NPM|DB_|DATABASE|API|WEBHOOK|JENKINS|OCTOPUS|CONNECTION/i, then POSTs the collected payload to a hardcoded webhook at https://test.v3n.my/pwn via https.request. The 99.0.0 version and internal-sounding name are the canonical dependency-confusion shape used to override a private registry package of the same name.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for greatcall-customers-commandapi (version 99.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging greatcall-customers-commandapi across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
greatcall-customers-commandapi is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If greatcall-customers-commandapi was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks greatcall-customers-commandapi before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks greatcall-customers-commandapi-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.