Which versions of grateful-payments are malicious?

The following npm versions of grateful-payments are flagged malicious: 99.0.0-canary.1. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate grateful-payments if I installed it?

grateful-payments establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.

I already installed grateful-payments — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If grateful-payments was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is grateful-payments part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — grateful-payments is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-005111, IN-MAL-2026-005112 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find grateful-payments across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for grateful-payments (version 99.0.0-canary.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging grateful-payments across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

grateful-paymentsnpm

Malicious code in grateful-payments (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-5445

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall grateful-payments

What this malware does

On npm install, the package's postinstall script (src/canary.js) performs a DNS lookup and HTTPS GET to the hardcoded host 96e03fa6c292469a-172-245-86-254.serveousercontent.com at path /c. serveousercontent.com is an anonymous reverse-tunnel service, so the destination is operator-controlled and not tied to a verifiable publisher. Every installer's machine emits an unconsented outbound network call at install time, revealing source IP, DNS resolver path, and install timing to the tunnel operator — a classic install-fleet beaconing pattern used to confirm compromise reach. The package's own metadata describes itself as a HackerOne research canary with an empty main module, but the install-time network behavior is identical to a real install-time beacon and runs on anyone who installs this version.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

99.0.0-canary.1

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

1a7a07a0a09ed8037058353b9b9b067e25e3cbe783eaab8d54276d490f823471

bbd4cc6cf034de9a6a7d4edd97f5fcea8b806ad98dacb14372e5a632477861ad

Detection & response playbook

Backdoor / remote access

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for grateful-payments (version 99.0.0-canary.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging grateful-payments across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
grateful-payments establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If grateful-payments was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks grateful-payments before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. grateful-payments on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 99.0.0-canary.1 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-005111IN-MAL-2026-005112

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks grateful-payments-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring