Which versions of google-payment are malicious?

The following npm versions of google-payment are flagged malicious: 999.9.9, 999.9.10. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate google-payment if I installed it?

google-payment is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed google-payment — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If google-payment was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is google-payment part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — google-payment is associated with the RLMA-2025-00857, GHSA-8xvq-gmp9-g92r, RLUA-2025-05024, RLUA-2025-05382, RLUA-2025-05805 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find google-payment across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for google-payment (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging google-payment across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

google-paymentnpm

google-payment is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2025-1826) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 999.9.9, 999.9.10). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in google-payment (npm)

MAL-2025-1826

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall google-payment

What this malware does

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

This package installs a dependency hosted on a custom domain that runs an info stealer during installation. The info stealer focuses on stealing npm, git, and other CI/CD related tokens.

Malicious versions

2 flagged

999.9.9999.9.10

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

d77d2ce13955279949e447abe8c11bff61ef40842f9d359cc6794366c78e780d

2721059d3c235150be73e56a8ee8116350dc5833b7ddfd198691407d6b8d834b

cefc7946ad381b1ff5c9ce7b6b5dc13cf76be2cec4b756a12ca94caf3577df04

9686f5d2d6ec203b4eb4c6f0f923cf05b12ce5d9faa640f6d613887a70b79547

662dee0fc98546f96435d3f781cc70a413d6ee2794c69af929eb97368e19773c

b58f2a2b5e28595f368711ac963cb4060300dc6d5926cc41b20b92296b8ff319

537e29277c7543867d55f505dc8df5c670a7ac0ee410923ec18846f1fe8df207

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for google-payment (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging google-payment across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
google-payment is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If google-payment was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks google-payment before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. google-payment on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 999.9.9, 999.9.10 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

RLMA-2025-00857GHSA-8xvq-gmp9-g92rRLUA-2025-05024RLUA-2025-05382RLUA-2025-05805

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
ReversingLabs · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks google-payment-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

All malware advisories How O3 detects malware Vulnerability database