google-caja-bowernpm
Malicious code in google-caja-bower (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
[email protected] declares scripts.preinstall = 'node index.js', so index.js runs automatically on npm install. index.js walks the installer's current working directory, builds a directory tree, enumerates up to 500 files (skipping only common binary/media extensions) up to 8MB each, and POSTs the tree plus each file's bytes as multipart uploads to two hardcoded Discord webhook URLs under discord.com/api/webhooks/. The payload also collects os.hostname(), process.env.USER / process.env.USERNAME, os.platform(), and process.cwd() and includes them in the webhook messages. Because the file filter excludes only binary/media types, credential-bearing text files present in the working tree (.env,.npmrc, ssh configs, cloud credentials, source code) are uploaded verbatim. The package name impersonates the Google Caja / Bower namespace and its own package description self-labels the behavior as 'collect and send system information to a remote endpoint'; the webhook message body identifies the campaign as 'Dependency Confusion Crawler'.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for google-caja-bower (7 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging google-caja-bower across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
google-caja-bower is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If google-caja-bower was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks google-caja-bower before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks google-caja-bower-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.