gmail-changernpm
gmail-changer is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-10635) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 2.0.2). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in gmail-changer (npm)
What this malware does
Package exports a complete Gmail account-hijack pipeline driven by stolen session cookies. Exported helpers (waitForRemoveRecovery, waitForRecoveryAdd, waitForPasswordChange, waitForDeviceLogout, waitForTwoFaActive, waitForNameChange) automate, in sequence: removing the victim's recovery phone number, injecting an attacker-controlled recovery email at the hardcoded domain @oletters.com, resetting the password to a random string, signing every other device out, harvesting 2FA seed + backup codes, and changing the display name. OTP interception is wired to a hardcoded SMS-rental endpoint at sever1.tempxapi.com/api/sms, where the package polls for incoming Google verification codes (G-\d{6}) using an X-Integrity-Token to drive recovery-number swaps and login challenges. index.js getMailYear additionally POSTs to Gmail's undocumented sync RPC at mail.google.com/sync/u/0/i/bv with stolen cookies to enumerate the victim's ^all mailbox (up to 2000 messages per page) for post-takeover reconnaissance. Puppeteer is launched with puppeteer-extra-plugin-stealth, --ignore-certificate-errors, and request interception that silently swallows Gmail's SetOSID redirect (replaced with a 200 OK stub) to harvest the session without completing the page transition. Every advertised API mutates a Google account against its owner's interests; there is no legitimate use case. Installing or loading this package equips the installer with — and contributes to a public ecosystem of — operational account-takeover tooling, with a hardcoded attacker drop-domain (@oletters.com) and third-party OTP relay baked in.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for gmail-changer (version 2.0.2). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging gmail-changer across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
gmail-changer is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If gmail-changer was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks gmail-changer before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks gmail-changer-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.