gloggonpm
gloggo is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-16054) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious versions 1.1.2, 1.1.3, 1.1.4). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in gloggo (npm)
What this malware does
gloggo impersonates the legitimate gulpjs 'glogg' logging library by copying its README, shields, and LICENSE text (attributed to Blaine Bublitz), while package.json attributes authorship to 'Blockvora Team [email protected]' with repository 'blockvora/gloggo'. The package name is a one-character variant of 'glogg'. getLogger() invokes isSign('favorite','gloggo',12467) from the dependency 'file-type-detector' and, when that gate returns truthy, executes require('./log'). The './log' module is not present in the tarball, so its bytes must be produced or supplied at require time by the dependency. A logging utility has no legitimate reason to gate its loader on an opaque file-signature check from an unrelated third-party dependency, and the gated path executes code that is not part of the shipped package contents. Consumers who install gloggo believing it to be glogg import a typosquat that conditionally runs code sourced from a suspicious sibling dependency when the module is required.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for gloggo (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging gloggo across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
gloggo is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove gloggo, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If gloggo was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks gloggo before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks gloggo-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.