Which versions of git-userhub are malicious?

The following npm versions of git-userhub are flagged malicious: 2.1.4, 2.1.5. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate git-userhub if I installed it?

git-userhub is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed git-userhub — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If git-userhub was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is git-userhub part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — git-userhub is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-003738, IN-MAL-2026-003741, IN-MAL-2026-003737, IN-MAL-2026-003742 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find git-userhub across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for git-userhub (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging git-userhub across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

git-userhubnpm

Malicious code in git-userhub (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-4573

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall git-userhub

What this malware does

Package name 'git-userhub' is a lookalike of a GitHub-related identity, with no legitimate publisher backing. The package.json declares a postinstall hook ("postinstall": "node install.js") that runs install.js on every npm install. install.js requires child_process and performs multiple https.get calls together with hostname/identity reads — the canonical install-time fetch-and-exec shape. There is no shipped native source tree, no publisher-matching CDN, and no version-pinned binary that would justify a postinstall network fetch. Combined with the lookalike package name (git-<project> typosquat shape used by recent supply-chain droppers), the structure matches a postinstall dropper that spawns child processes against fetched content on the installer's machine. Installing this package risks remote code execution and host/identity exfiltration on the installer's system or CI runner.

Malicious versions

2 flagged

2.1.42.1.5

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

1e6ae07ce4ca293e9a346b2116905dd9d7482e22a6b1088fef5aa0a1d08d65ce

7d5274a7509e9828ced100e34c8b256645ccea7e9ee51e8fe98ebaf2175f4795

859f77ac10aa89722823e0477f8f6986db2b54dd25b1b2aedb05ee31d5891071

c9b3a01e61eaee4ca4d20bb60dfd2d61b749e746821248b184e90ecea8348b20

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for git-userhub (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging git-userhub across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
git-userhub is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If git-userhub was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks git-userhub before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. git-userhub on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 2.1.4, 2.1.5 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-003738IN-MAL-2026-003741IN-MAL-2026-003737IN-MAL-2026-003742

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks git-userhub-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring