ggk-happynpm
ggk-happy is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-4789) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.0.9, 1.2.0, 1.2.12…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in ggk-happy (npm)
What this malware does
Package presents itself as the legitimate slopus/happy CLI (README instructs npm install -g happy; homepage, repository, bugs, and author fields all point at happy.engineering / github.com/slopus/happy), but the published name is ggk-happy and the shipped code has been modified in ways that harm installers:
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Backend redirection: DEFAULT_SERVER_URL is hardcoded to https://happy-api.ask-ggk.com and DEFAULT_WEBAPP_URL to https://happy.ask-ggk.com — third-party hosts not disclosed in the README, which still references api.cluster-fluster.com. All coding-agent sessions (Claude Code / Codex prompts, source code, auth tokens, machine metadata) flow to ask-ggk.com instead of the publisher advertised in package metadata.
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Remote-control surface pointed at attacker infrastructure: ApiSessionClient / ApiMachineClient open a socket.io connection to the redirected server and register RPC handlers named
bash,readFile,writeFile,listDirectory,getDirectoryTree,ripgrep,difftastic. Thebashhandler runsexecAsync(data.command, options)on parameters supplied by the remote server. Whoever operates happy-api.ask-ggk.com can execute arbitrary shell commands and read/write files on the installer's machine. -
Install-time auto-takeover: scripts/postinstall.cjs, on global or root install, unconditionally spawns
node bin/happy.mjs install, running the full auth/registration flow (browser opened to happy.ask-ggk.com, machine registered to happy-api.ask-ggk.com, daemon started) atnpm install -gtime. Auto-takeover is opt-out via env var, not opt-in, sosudo npm install -g ggk-happyimmediately binds the machine to the third-party backend, with elevated privileges on Linux/macOS root installs. -
Unpinned binary dropper: RTK_DOWNLOAD_URLS fetches platform-specific
rtkbinaries from https://minio.ask-ggk.com/happy/rtk-*.{zip,tar.gz} (win32/darwin/linux, x64/arm64) with no hash or signature verification, stages them to ~/.local/share/ggkhappy/rtk/bin/rtk (or %LOCALAPPDATA%\ggkhappy\rtk\bin\rtk.exe), and later invokes them via execFile. Purpose of the binary is not documented. -
Covert identity reporting: readRtkIdentity() reads the installer's machineId from ~/.happy settings and the auth token from ~/.happy/access.key and POSTs them, together with platform/version fields, to https://guguke.ask-ggk.com/api/v1/agent/rtk/gain/report — a side channel to a host not referenced in README documentation.
This is not a legitimate fork: the surface identity (name, homepage, repo, README install command) still claims to be slopus/happy, while all backends, the remote-shell RPC destination, the runtime binary source, and the identity reporter have been repointed to ask-ggk.com infrastructure. Installers who follow the README believe they are installing the upstream project and instead grant an undisclosed operator remote code execution over their machine and full visibility into their AI coding sessions.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for ggk-happy (12 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging ggk-happy across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
ggk-happy is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If ggk-happy was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks ggk-happy before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks ggk-happy-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.